

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

1 March 1951

SUBJECT: NIE-29: YUGOSLAVIA

THE PROBLEM

To assess the capabilities and intentions of the USSR and its European Satellites with respect to action against Yugoslavia during 1951.

CONCLUSIONS

The ultimate Soviet objectives in Yugoslavia are
1. ~~(The Kremlin aims eventually)~~ to eliminate the Tito Govern-
ment, to replace it by a regime subservient to the USSR, and

to integrate Yugoslavia politically, economically, and strate-

gically into the European Satellite structure. However, the

USSR has given no clear indication that it intends to try to eliminate

the Tito regime regardless of the cost or that it has implicitly
suggested that it intends to bring about the
overthrow of the Tito regime at any cost or within any time

period.

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During 1951
2. It is unlikely that the Tito regime could be overthrown ~~during 1951~~ by a Soviet-inspired coup or by internal revolt. *The USSR would have to resort to* Therefore, ~~Satellite or Soviet-Satellite invasion would be~~ *if it intended to* ~~overthrow Tito~~ *necessary to achieve this end in 1951.*

The capability of the neighboring Satellite to attack Yugoslavia
3. ~~The continuing military build-up in the neighboring~~ *unusually* ~~Satellite states (increase in armed forces, stockpiling, re-~~ *recently been* ~~equipment, gasoline conservation, stepping-up of war industry,~~ *satellite* ~~etc.) has reversed the previous balance of military strength~~ *between them and Yugoslavia, and given the satellites the capability of launching* ~~between them and Yugoslavia, and given the satellites the capability of~~ *a successful* ~~ability to attack Yugoslavia with little or no warning.~~ *invasion of*

4. Yugoslavia could not ~~successfully~~ defend itself against *or no* *warning,* a sustained attack by the four neighboring Satellite powers (Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary, and Albania) *if this attack were* conducted under unified command and with full logistical support from the USSR. *The Yugoslavs would resist, however, and could conduct operations for some time* ~~Guerrilla-type resistance, however, would continue after the~~ collapse of formal military resistance.

5. Joint Soviet-Satellite forces could successfully invade Yugoslavia, overcome formal military resistance, and eventually render guerrilla operations ineffective.

#10 6. Yugoslav capabilities and morale are such that substantial Western assistance in military materiel would probably

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enable Yugoslavia to defend itself successfully against a

Satellite attack, ^{such assistance could} and even extend the period of resistance

to a full-scale Soviet-Satellite attack. ^{Any Western material} However, such material

^{sent} would have to be adapted to the special requirements of Yugo-

slav forces, ^(Moreover,) and to be effective ^{to Yugoslavia} in the initial stages of an

invasion, ^{it} would have to be delivered well in advance of hostili-

ties and would have to ^{flow} be on a continuing basis.

~~9. The Kremlin might estimate that the conquest of Yugo-~~
~~in 1951~~

~~slavia could be accomplished with less risk of general war in 1951~~
~~than at any later date.~~

7. ~~8.~~ 8. If the USSR decides to launch an attack on Yugoslavia
in 1951, we believe that the attack probably will be made by
Satellite forces with "unofficial" Soviet assistance as re-
quired.

8. 9. Indications are not conclusive as to whether or not
an attack on Yugoslavia will be launched in 1951. The scope
of continuing Satellite military preparations ^{points to} indicates that
the ground work is being laid for a possible Satellite attack
against Yugoslavia. The military build-up of the Satellites
has not been confined to the Satellites adjacent to Yugoslavia.
In the case of Bulgaria and Albania, the military preparations

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by themselves could indicate preparations for a future attack against Greece and Turkey as well as Yugoslavia. Since July 1950 ^{although} Cominform propaganda has ^(since July 1950) consistently advanced arguments ^{could be made} that would justify an attack on Yugoslavia, ^{recent} There has recently been no development in this propaganda that would indicate an attack at an early date.

There is no conclusive evidence that the USSR has reached a decision to launch an attack on Yugoslavia in 1951.

10. Although the USSR would probably not make such a decision unless it were prepared to accept general war, there is a possibility that it may estimate that such an attack could be successfully carried through without provoking general war. In any event, we believe a Satellite attack on Yugoslavia in 1951 must be considered a real possibility.

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7. If the USSR decides to launch an attack on Yugoslavia in 1951, we believe that the attack probably will be made by Satellite forces with "unofficial" Soviet assistance as required.

8. Continuing large-scale Satellite military preparations indicate that the groundwork is being laid for a possible invasion of Yugoslavia. These indications are not conclusive evidence of an attack on Yugoslavia since there has been a military build-up in the other Satellite states in addition to the ones adjacent to Yugoslavia and since, in the case of Bulgaria and Albania, the military preparations could point to an attack on Greece or Turkey as well as Yugoslavia. Moreover, there is no conclusive evidence that military preparations pointing toward a Satellite attack on Yugoslavia are timed for an attack in 1951. Cominform propaganda since July 1950 has consistently advanced arguments that could be used to justify a Satellite attack on Yugoslavia, but there has been no recent trend in such propaganda suggesting an attack at an early date.

9. ~~There is a possibility that~~ The Kremlin may estimate that a Satellite invasion of Yugoslavia could be carried through successfully without ^{precipitating} ~~provoking~~ general war ^{and it} ~~the~~ ~~Kremlin~~ may consider the risk of ~~precipitating~~ general war

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to be less in 1951 than ~~they would~~ be later. While the USSR would probably not decide to launch a Satellite attack on Yugoslavia in 1951 unless it is willing to accept a substantial risk of precipitating general war, we believe such an attack in 1951 must be considered a real possibility.

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